In this work, we are interested in capacities which are deformations of probability i.e v = f • P . We characterize balanced, totally balanced, exact and convex capacities, by properties concerning the probability transformation function, f . We also give the explicit expression, in the case of a convex capacity v = f • P , of a probability in the core of v which coincides with v on a given finite chain of elements of the algebra A. As a dividend of our analysis, we obtain simple new characterizations of a large pattern of risk aversions, relevant to the Yaari rank-dependent expected utility model.
Introduction
Set functions, which are not necessarily additive, are frequently used in decision theory. Indeed, they have different interpretations: on the one hand, they represent transferable utility or the characteristic function of a cooperative game; while on the other hand, they represent non-additive probabilities. In this work, we are interested in capacities which are deformations of a given probability, i.e.: v = f • P where P is a non-atomic additive probability on a measurable space (Ω, A) where Ω is a non-empty set, A a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω and f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a nondecreasing function, satisfying f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. The main purpose of this paper is to characterize a wide classical range of monotone normalized games i.e capacities, by properties concerning the probability transformation f . As a dividend, building upon [3] , this allows us to obtain directly simple new characterizations of a large pattern of risk attitudes relevant to Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk [14] , in terms of simple specific properties of the capacity arising in Yaari's model. The paper is organized as follows: in the second section, we introduce some notations, definitions and preliminary results. Section 3 is essentially devoted to the characterization of balanced, totally balanced, exact and convex capacities by properties related to f . The most salient result, related to Wallner [13] who dealt with robust statistics, concerns exact capacities which are proved to be obtained through star-shaped distortions. In section 4, results of section 3 are straightforwardly applied for deriving new characterizations of several kinds of risk aversion for decision makersà la Yaari. Section 5 concludes.
Definitions, Notation and Preliminary Results
A game is a triple (Ω, A, v) where Ω is a non empty set, A is an algebra of subsets of Ω and v is a function v : A → R + such that v(∅) = 0. If there is no risk of confusion we will speak simply about game v. The game v is called a (normalized) capacity if (i) v is normalized i.e. v(Ω) = 1, and (ii) v is monotone i.e. A, B ∈ A and A ⊂ B implies v(A) v(B). Each (normalized) capacity v has a dual (normalized) capacityv defined byv(A) = 1 − v(Ā) for all A ∈ A. Elements of Ω are usually called players (or agents) or states of nature and the elements of A are called coalitions or events, depending on whether the context is game theory or decision under uncertainty. v(A) is interpreted then as a measurement of the power of coalition A (for example in the division of a perfectly divisible good, v(A) is the quantity of this good the agents of A can obtain without the assistance of agents of the complementary coalition) or the "subjective probability" of the event A.
It is easy to check that if A is an algebra of subsets of Ω and A ∈ A, the family A ∩ A is an algebra of subsets of A. If A ∈ A, then the game (A, A ∩ A, v |A∩A ) is called the restriction of v to the coalition A. The game v |A∩A will be simply denoted v |A .
The core of a game (Ω, A, v) is the set core(v) = {λ : A → R + |λ is a finitely additive measure, λ(Ω) = v(Ω) and λ v}.
The core represents the set of possible divisions of the benefit v(Ω) where no coalition can protest in the name of its own capacity. It is also the set of probabilities which are considered by the decision maker, as susceptible to manage the situation of uncertainty. A game v is said to be:
(b) totally balanced if for all A ∈ A, its restriction to A is balanced.
The minimum in the preceeding expression is reached since core(v) is compact for the weak-topology of the space of additive and bounded measures.
. v is called super-additive if the preceeding inequality holds whenever A 1 , A 2 ∈ A and
An equivalent condition (due to Shapley [12] ) to the convexity of v is
thus when Ω is finite:
This expresses an increasing marginal utility with certainty (in situation of decision under uncertainty) or with the number of members of a coalition (in game theory). Intuitively, it says that the "incentives" to join a coalition increase with its size (creating a "snowballing" effect), which is the analogue of the increasing outputs scales associated to a convex production function in an economy. Shapley [12] gave an elegant justification of the term "convex": let B ∈ A, define a "differential" operator by:
. Then the convexity of v is equivalent to [∆ CB v](A) 0; ∀A, B, C ∈ A, which is similar to the positivity of second derivatives of a convex function in real analysis.
It is well-known (see for example [10] ) that one has the following implications:
We recall here characterizations of exact, balanced, totally balanced and convex games. To prove theorem 2.1, Kannai [9] used a fundamental result due to Ky Fan [6] concerning linear systems of inequalities in a real normed vector space. Schmeidler [10] proved the same result using a separation theorem. See also Chateauneuf [1] .
For A ⊆ Ω, A * denotes the characteristic function of A i.e. the function defined on Ω, being equal to 1 on A and 0 elsewhere. Theorem 2.1. Let A be a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω and v a game. v is exact iff for all n ∈ N * ; a ∈ R; a 1 , ..., a n ∈ R + ; A, A 1 , ..., A n ∈ A:
Corollary 2.1. The game v is balanced if and only if ∀n ∈ N * ; a 1 , ..., a n 0 and A 1 , ..., A n ∈ A we have:
Corollary 2.2. The game v is totally balanced if and only if ∀n ∈ N * ; ∀a 1 , ..., a n 0 and A, A 1 , ..., A n ∈ A we have:
Theorem 2.2. The game v is convex if and only if for any finite sequence
Proof. See [5] .
We give in proposition 3.5. below, when v is a convex distorted probability, an explicit expression of such a probability λ.
Recall the following definitions, introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer [8] , which will be useful for the sequel. Anti − core(v) = {λ : A → R + such that: λ is a finitely additive measure, λ(Ω) = v(Ω) and λ v}. Anti-balancedness and total anti-balancedness are then defined in a classic manner: v is said to be anti − balanced if anti − core(v) = ∅. It is said to be totally anti − balanced if ∀A ∈ A, v |A is anti-balanced. We have the following characterization that we prove for sake of completeness.
Proposition 2.1. v is anti-balanced iff ∀n ∈ N; ∀a 1 , . . . , a n 0 and A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ A, the following implication holds:
Proof. ⇒: Immediate.
⇐:
We use Ky Fan's theorem [6] : Let {x ν } ν∈J be a family of elements, not all 0, in a real normed vector space E, and {α ν } ν∈J a family of corresponding real numbers. Let
The question is then equivalent to finding g ∈ V (where V = {X: Ω → R such that X is A-measurable and bounded}) such that g is positive and:
Let β 1 , β 2 , ..., β n > 0 and Ω * , −Ω * , A * j ∈ V (for 3 j n; A j ∈ A) such that:
Corollary 2.3. v is totally anti-balanced iff: ∀n ∈ N; ∀a 1 , . . . , a n 0, ∀A ∈ A and ∀A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ A∩A, the following implication holds:
is nondecreasing on [0, 1] \{t}. In the following remark, we present some characterizations of star-shaped functions which will be useful thereafter, most of these characterizations rise from definitions by simple calculations. We give a proof of (iv) which appears to be more relevant. , ∀0 < x < y 1.
(ii) f is star-shaped at 1 if and only if
, ∀0 x < y < 1.
(iii) f is star-shaped at 1 if and only iff
(iv) f is star-shaped at 0 and 1 if and only if f = min i∈I f i where I is a non-empty set and
Proof. While the minimum of concave functions is a concave function, the minimum of convex functions is a star-shaped function.
. Let x ∈ (0, 1), and
1−x since f is star-shaped at 0 and 1), g x f and g x (x) = f (x).
Sufficient Condition Let 0 < x < y 1 then ∃j ∈ I/f (y) = f j (y) hence
Then f is star-shaped at 0 (proposition 3.
Then f is star-shaped at 1.
Points (i) and (ii) of the preceding remark 3.1 make it possible to give a geometrical interpretation of star-shapedness at 0 and 1, indeed a function f is star-shaped at 0 and 1 if and only if for any x ∈ [0, 1], the cord connecting the point with co-ordinates (x, f (x)) to the origin (to the point with co-ordinates (1,
Proof.
(ii) Monotonicity follows obviously from the fact that f is star-shaped at 0. Continuity arises from star-shapedness at 1: The functions f and t −→ 1−f (t) 1−t are monotone, thus have limits on the right and on the left at any point of (0,1), a limit on the right at 0 and one limit on the left at 1. Let x ∈ [0,1); we have:
. Let x ∈ (0,1); we have:
Hence f is continuous at x; ∀x ∈(0,1) and f is continuous on the right at 0. A probability P on (Ω, A) is said to be non-atomic if ∀A ∈ A, ∀α ∈ [0, P (A)] : ∃B ∈ A and B ⊂ A|P (B) = α.
In the sequel of this section A is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, P is a non-atomic probability on (Ω, A) and f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a nondecreasing function satisfying f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Denote by v the capacity v = f • P . In some economic applications, P represents the initial distribution of resources and f represents a production function.
In the following proposition, we give a necessary and sufficient condition on the transformation f of the probability so that capacity v is balanced. Proof . Assume v is balanced. We show f ( m n ) m n ; ∀n ∈ N * , ∀m ∈ {1..., n}. Let n ∈ N * , since P is non-atomic, ∃A 1 ..., A n ∈ A such that P (A i ) = 1 n ∀i ∈ {1..., n} and A i ∩ A j = ∅ ∀i, j ∈ {1..., n} with i = j. Let m ∈ {1..., n}; denote C = I ⊂ {1, ..., n}/|I| = m}, the cardinal of C is then |C| = C m n = n! m!(n−m)! . For I ∈ C: let A I = ∪ i∈I A i (thus A I ∈ A and P (A I ) = 
r. We show then (knowing that f is nondecreasing) that f (x) x; ∀x ∈ [0, 1). Let x ∈ [0, 1) and (r n ) n∈N a sequence of rationals which decreases towards x then ∀n : f (r n ) r n thus, taking the limits limits, we get f (x + ) x but f (x + ) f (x) hence f (x) x; ∀x ∈ [0, 1) and the inequality is clearly satisfied at 1.
The converse is straightforward since P ∈ core(v), thus v is balanced.
The following proposition characterizes totally balanced capacities v = f • P .
Proposition 3.2. v is totally balanced if and only if f is star-shaped at 0.
Proof. Assume that v is totally balanced. To show that f is star-shaped at 0, it is enough to prove: for all n ∈ N * and 1 < m n:
. Let n ∈ N * : since P is non-atomic, ∃A 1 ..., A n ∈ A such that P (A i ) = 1 n ∀i ∈ {1..., n} and A i ∩ A j = ∅∀i, j ∈ {1..., n} with i = j. Let A = ∪ m j=1 A j where 1 < m n. Then:
. That is:
with a b, and f being monotone (nondecreasing), has a limit on the left and on the right at any point x ∈ (0, 1), a limit on the right at 0 and a limit on the left at 1. Let x, y ∈ (0,1 ] |x < y; (a n ) n∈N and (b n ) n∈N two sequences of rationals in (0,1] such that a n decreases towards x and b n increases towards y (then for n large enough: a n b n ), thus for n large enough:
bn . Taking the limits when n → ∞, we obtain:
(because f is nondecreasing) hence
y and then: f is star-shaped at 0. Conversely, assume that f is star-shaped at 0 and let A ∈ A. We show that core(v |A ) = ∅ i.e there exists λ :
Since f is star-shaped at 0, we get ∀B ∈ A ∩ A :
Star-shapedness of f at 1 characterizes the total anti-balancedness ofv. Proposition 3.3. f is star-shaped at 1 iffv is totally anti-balanced.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the previous proposition. Assumev is totally anti-balanced, to show that f is star-shaped at 1, it is enough to prove that: ∀n ∈ N * , ∀0 m < n − 1 we have:
A j where 0 m < n−1, then using proposition 2.1, we get the desired result.
Conversely, assume f is star-shaped at 1 and let A ∈ A. Then, under the usual convention
Now we characterize capacities v = f • P which are exact. Proof . If v is exact then v is totally balanced andv is totally anti-balanced. Hence f is star-shaped at 0 and 1.
If f is star-shaped at 0 and 1 then we have f = min i∈I f i where I = ∅ and the f i 's are convex satisfying f i (0) = 0 and f i (1) = 1. Thus v = f • P = min i∈I v i , where v i = f i • P are convex capacities (since f i 's are, according to proposition 3.5 below) therefore exact.
The following result appears in [1] . 
hence f is convex (since it is continuous). Now, if f is convex: since a probability is an increasing set function, we have
thus α + β = 1 then
i.e: v is convex.
The following proposition is inspired by Wallner [13] . We give the explicit expression, in the case of a convex capacity v = f • P , of a probability in the core of v which coincides with v on a given finite chain of elements of the σ−algebra A. 
is in core(v) and satisfies: λ(A j ) = v(A j ), ∀j ∈ {0..., n}.
Proof . It is clear that λ is a probability and that it coincides with v on the chain. Let B ∈ A; we have
and since f is convex
. That is λ ∈ core(v).
Yaari's model, capacities and risk aversion
Let P be a non-atomic σ-additive probability on (Ω, A) and a nontrivial weak order on B ∞ (Ω, A), the set of measurable and bounded random variables on Ω, satisfying:
• Continuity w.r.t. monotone convergence:
• Co-monotonic independence: X ∼ Y , Z is co-monotonic with X and Y implies X + Z ∼ Y + Z;
• First order stochastic dominance: A, B ∈ A : P (A) P (B) ⇒ A * B * .
Under these assumptions one obtains Yaari's model, namely there exists a capacity v s.t. is represented by the functional:
and moreover, there exists a unique continuous non-decreasing mapping f :
, [11] and [14] for further details). We recall in the following, the definitions of four notions of mean-preserving increase in risk, introduced in [3] .
Let Z be a random variable. We denote by F = F Z the cumulative distribution function of Z (for x ∈ R : F (x) = P (Z x)), F −1 the generalized inverse of F , for p ∈ [0, 1) :
Let X and Y be two random variables having the same mean. Y is said to be a general mean preserving increase in risk (MPIR) of X if
. Which means that the expected position for the p% smallest values is greater for X than for Y .
Y is a monotone mean preserving increase in risk (M-MPIR) of X if:
is a non-increasing function of p ∈ (0, 1). Which can be written:
Y (p); ∀0 < p < q < 1. This means that the interquantile intervals are shorter for X than for Y .
Y is a left monotone mean preserving increase in risk (LM-MPIR) of X if To each concept of increase in risk corresponds a concept of risk aversion: A decision maker (DM) is strongly risk averse (monotone risk averse, left monotone risk averse, right monotone risk averse, respectively) if for any random variables X and Y such that Y is a MPIR (M-MPIR, LM-MPIR, RM-MPIR, respectively) of X, the decision maker prefers X to Y .
Building upon Lemma 4 in [3] , the following result is immediate.
Proposition 4.1. In Yaari's model
• The DM is right monotone risk averse if and only if v is totally balanced.
• The DM is left monotone risk averse if and only ifv is totally anti-balanced.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we aimed at showing that for distorted probabilities, classical properties of capacities as balancedness, convexity, exactness, etc... prove to be related to simple properties of the distortion function, and moreover that these classical properties of the capacity are intimately related to meaningful risk aversion attitudes for decision makersà la Yaari. This suggests that under uncertainty it might be fruitful to investigate for the Choquet expected utility model (Schmeidler (1989) , Gilboa (1987) ) which kind of uncertainty aversion is linked for instance with the use of totally balanced or exact capacities, in the same way as it has already been done for convex or balanced capacities (see for example: Schmeidler (1989), Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) ).
